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RECENT CASES
EMINENT DOMAIN-DENIAL OF DETENTION DAMAGES
-JURY MAY INFER EXCESSIVE DEMAND FROM
OWNER'S VALUE OPINION AT TRIALSUBSEQUENT STATUTORY REFORM
Mott v. Commonwealth, 417 Pa. 426, 207 A.2d 872 (1965)
Little in our system of law is more firmly settled than the right of a
property owner to just compensation for loss of or damage to his property
through condemnation and taking for public use under the power of eminent
domain.' Somewhat less clearly defined, however, has been a Pennsylvania
condemnee's right to recovery for suspension of his use and enjoyment of
the property or its monetary equivalent during any period of delay between
the time of taking and the time of ultimate payment. Generally, before
passage of the Eminent Domain Act of 19642 guaranteeing six percent on
all monies not remitted or paid into court from the time of taking, such
recovery had been denied only where a jury could find that the delay was
occasioned by the condemnee's own misconduct or lack of good faith.3 On
appeal of a case arising prior to the act, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
recently held in Mott v. Commonwealth4 that a jury could infer bad faith in
the form of excessive and unreasonable demands where the owner testified at
trial to his own opinion of the damages sustained.

In June of 1960 the Department of Highways condemned and took a
portion of land belonging to John Mott, necessitating substantial construction
1. 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain §§ 96-103. See also Monongahela Nay. Co. v. United
States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893) ; McMasters v. Commonwealth, 3 Watts 292 (Pa. 1834).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1-611 (Supp. 1964) provides:
The condemnee shall not be entitled to compensation for delay in payment during
the period he remains-in possession after the condemnation, nor during such period
shall a condemnor be entitled to rent or other charges for use and occupancy of
the condemned property by the condemnee. Compensation for delay in payment
shall, however, be paid at the rate of six per cent per annum from the date of
relinquishment of possession of the condemned property by the condemnee, or if
the condemnation is such that possession is not required to effectuate it, then
delay compensation shall be paid from the date of condemnation: Provided,
however, That no compensation for delay shall be payable with respect to funds
paid on account, or by deposit in court, after the date of such payment or deposit.
Compensation for delay shall not be included by the viewers or the court or jury
on appeal as part of the award or verdict, but shall at the time of payment of the
award or judgment be calculated as above and added thereto. There shall be

no further or additional payment of interest on the award or verdict. (Emphasis
added.)
3. See Hoffman v. City of Philadelphia, 250 Pa. 1, 95 Atl. 322 (1915).
4. 417 Pa. 426, 207 A.2d 872 (1965).
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and filling to restore the utility of the remainder. Properly considering the
cost of such work as an element in determining the difference in value before
and after the taking,5 a Board of View had filed an award of 18,139.26 dollars.
Both parties appealed. At the trial two Commonwealth experts testified to
damages of 10,400 and 11,500 dollars respectively; whereas, plaintiff Mott's
witness offered a figure of 44,000 dollars. Plaintiff himself testified that his
opinion of the value differential was 50,000 dollars. The jury returned a
verdict in the amount of 27,500 dollars, and, in spite of nearly binding instructions to the contrary, 6 denied detention damages. The trial court, however, granted a motion for judgment n.o.v. with respect to damages for
delay, which judgment was reversed by the instant decision.
While loss of the use of property or its proceeds has been considered an
element of damage along with the value of the appropriated property,7 courts
have not been wholly consistent in their views on the right to recovery for
s
this loss. Some opinions refer to recovery of detention as a prima facie right
fortified by a presumption of good faith on the owner's part 9 which imposes
upon a condemnor the burden of proving otherwise by placing facts in evidence. 10 On the other hand, it has also been said that recovery of detention
for delay in payment is not a matter of right but depends upon circumstances
of the individual case."' Illustrative of the prevailing view is Wayne v. Pennsylvania R.R. 12 wherein the court declared:
Prima facie, he [the owner] is entitled to damages for delay in
payment. The law contemplates that in the first instance the parties
will themselves agree upon the amount. If they do agree, it is
presently payable and interest attaches as an incident. If they fail to
agree and either appeals to the court, it becomes a question of
damages; and here, again prima facie, the owner is entitled to
damages for the delay. But in fact he may not be so entitled. If he
has disappointed the law and stubbornly refused to name an amount
which he would be willing to accept as compensation; or in the same
spirit, has been extortionate in his demands, and has named a sum
exhorbitant and unreasonable, a jury might well find that he has
5. See, e.g., Regina v. Monroe County, 319 Pa. 257, 179 Atl. 35 (1935) (restoration cost not a specific item of damage but bears on market value) ; Hare v. Pittsburg,
C.C. & S.L.R.R., 10 Pa. Super. 647 (1899) (cost of necessary land filling may be considered).
6. Brief for Appellant and Record, p. 19a, Commonwealth v. Mott, 417 Pa. 426
(1965).
7. Condemnation of Espenshade's Land by the Turnpike Comm'n, 8 Pa. D. & C.2d
345 (C.P. 1957).
8. See, e.g., Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Commonwealth, 532 Pa. 143, 42
A.2d 585 (1945) ; Strause & Beck v. Commonwealth, 42 Sch. L.R. 92 (Pa. C.P. 1946);
In re Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 69 York 103 (Pa. C.P. 1955).
9. Commonwealth v. Haaf, 31 Leh. L.J. 106 (Pa. C.P. 1964).
10. Cox v. Pennsylvania Co., 263 Pa. 132, 106 Atl. 70 (1919).
11. Waugh v. Commonwealth, 394 Pa. 166, 146 A.2d 297 (1959).
12. 231 Pa. 512, 80 At. 1097 (1911).
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unreasonably provoked the delay and deny him all damages therefor. But the law will not presume any such conduct on his part.
If the [condemnor] would excuse itself . . . the burden is on it to

show the excusing
facts; failing in this, the right of the owner is
3

unquestionable.1

Reinforcing the suggestion that both the character and source of evidence
necessary to establish disqualifying fault are important is the opinion in Wolf
v. Commonwealth,'1 4 where, in sustaining a judgment n.o.v. for detention
damages, the court said:
As to the Commonwealth's first argument [alleging condemnee
fault] the record does not disclose any testimony whatsoever as to
what Wolf had demanded from the Commonwealth for these properties. If Wolf did make a demand or demands why did the Commonwealth not call [a witness] to prove the nature of such demand or
demands? The Commonwealth elected not to present such proof. 15
In this case, the owner did not testify personally and the court noted that
he was not responsible for the opinions of his experts, 16 but it may also be
noted that in Mott the owner testified not to any demands made but only to
his opinion of the damages, which he was competent' 7 to offer, subject to
allowance for his interest and lack of experience.' 8
Where a property owner testifies to an opinion on damages in an amount
greater than the jury's final determination, a conclusion that he is not entitled to detention money would seem necessarily to be based upon two
successive inferences: (a) that the owner in fact had demanded such a sum
and was persistent in his demand; and, (b) that such demand was at least
the substantial cause of the delay for which compensation is sought. In the
absence of an admission of actual demands, 19 the first inference is open to
serious question. The seller of property or goods generally has a high opinion
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
Q.

Id. at 515, 80 Atl. at 1097.
403 Pa. 499, 170 A.2d 557 (1961).
Id. at 504, 170 A.2d at 560.
Ibid.
Westinghouse Air Brake Co. v. Pittsburgh, 316 Pa. 372, 176 Atl. 13 (1934).
Lenik Condemnation Case, 404 Pa. 257, 172 A.2d 316 (1961).
On direct examination, plaintiff Mott testified as follows:
Now, Mr. Mott, do you have an opinion as to the fair market value of your
lot before the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania took it for the highway
project on June 22, 1960?
A. I do.
Q. How much?
A. Seventy-five thousand.
Q. Do you have an opinion as to the fair market value of your lot immediately
after the taking and as affected by the condemnation by the Department of
Highways June 22nd, 1960?
A. About twenty-five thousand.
Q. Therefore, the difference between those two figures, namely, is $50,000.00?
A. That's right.
Record, p. 14a, Commonwealth v. Mott, 417 Pa. 426 (1965).
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of their value; however, this is not to say that he necessarily would refuse
to settle for less. Moreover, opinions regarding the value of real property
are subject to wide variation even among experts. 20 This is particularly true
where there is an element of peculiar value, 21 or, as in the instant case, the
requirement of complex restoration work to consider. Finally, the natural
tendency to overstate value once expensive litigation has been undertaken
does not seem presumptive of unwillingness to accept a smaller sum in the
earlier stages of negotiation.
The second inference can present even greater difficulty, particularly
where the jury's ultimate award exceeds the amount of both the viewers'
finding and the condemnor's contention by a substantial margin. If, as in
the instant case, a condemnor offers or contends for an amount far below
actual value as a jury determines, and if a board of view files an award
significantly smaller, can it be said that delay occasioned by litigation is the
property owner's fault? He would appear to have no other means to assure
just compensation. Denial of detention damages in such a case is difficult
to rationalize in view of decisions such as Rednor & Kline, Inc. v. Department
of Highways.22 In that recent case, damages for delay in payment were upheld despite written evidence on the record that the condemnee had demanded
106,224 dollars, whereas the jury set the property value at 5,000 dollars, a
figure the condemnor had offered in writing to pay midway during the period
of delay. Similar written evidence of a demand for 25,000 dollars in payment
for property the jury valued at 10,000 dollars was permitted to be ignored
and detention awarded by the court in Levinson v. Department of Highways.23
There the court said:
Moreover, no information whatsoever was elicted as to the course
and nature of admitted negotiations between plaintiffs and representatives of the Department subsequent to the formal claim. Accordingly, no basis existed for any inference that such claim,
executed in 1953, had the slightest bearing upon, let alone was the
actual cause of the failure of the parties to agree on compensation
before trial in 1960.24
In neither of the latter cases, however, did the condemnee testify with respect
to demands or opinions.
20. Vaughn v. Commonwealth, 407 Pa. 189, 180 A.2d 12 (1962).
21. In the case of Scaro v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 32 Pa. D. & C.2d 272
(C.P. 1962) the court said:
The value placed on the area condemned by the owners and their witnesses
cannot be considered arbitrary or unreasonable because the question of value in
this case involved out-of-the-ordinary, if not unique, considerations.
Id. at 274. Reference was to the fact that the land involved was the only land available
to the condemnee for expansion of an adjacent business enterprise.
22. 413 Pa. 119, 196 A.2d 355 (1964).
23. 12 Bucks 292 (Pa. C.P. 1963).
24. Id. at 295.
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In holding that a jury could take the opinion testimony of plaintiffcondemnee as evidence of an excessive and unreasonable demand, the Mott
court cited its decision in Springer v. Allegheny County.25 In that case, the
condemnee had been granted an order for a new trial on several grounds,
one of which was denial of detention damages. The Supreme Court reversed
because there was no indication that such damages had not been included in
the award.2 6 Portions of the Springer opinion, however, are somewhat conflicting with respect to the effect of the owner's personal testimony. On one
hand the court declares that a virtually binding instruction to allow detention
money because there was "no evidence to the contrary" was "proper" ;27 on
the other hand, the opinion concludes that the owner's testimony provided
sufficient basis for a finding of unreasonableness and that the instruction was
more favorable than warranted.2 8 In any event, there is an important difference in the character of testimony offered in the two cases. Mott ventured
no more than an opinion as to before and after values 29 considering necesssary
extensive renovation, whereas the condemnee in Springer stated: "I priced
my ground at $25,000 and I have no apology to offer."'30 The latter testimony
would seem substantially more conclusive of a persistent demand. It is also
significant that the demand in Springer was for three times the amount of
the actual verdict which in turn was less than the viewers' finding. In other
cases, where compensation for delay was specifically disallowed to testifying
property owners, there was either additional evidence to support a finding
32
of faults' or a claim improper in nature as distinguished from amount.
While the Eminent Domain Act of 1964 appears to render moot the
problem of fault in causing delay of payment for property condemned subsequent to its enactment, there are presumably many cases currently in litigation to be decided under prior law. In view of the inconsistency in jury
25. 401 Pa. 557, 165 A.2d 383 (1960).
26. Id. at 567, 165 A.2d at 388.

27. Ibid.
28. Id. at 569, 165 A.2d at 389.
29. See note 19 supra.
30. 401 Pa. at 568, 165 A.2d at 389. (Emphasis added.)
31. See Kelly v. Redevelopment Authority of Allegheny County, 26 Pa. D. & C.2d
662 (C.P. 1961), aff'd per curian, 407 Pa. 414, 180 A.2d 908 (1962). Here, the owner
had testified to a purchase price of $2,000 and was claiming $525,000 some six years later
with no allegation of improvements, and the jury awarded $130,000. See also James v.
West Chester Borough, 220 Pa. 490, 69 Atl. 1042 (1908), wherein the owner claimed
$20,000 depreciation in value of a mill property occasioned by the diverting of some
available water for public use; there was evidence that the property had been sold
outright at public auction for $15,000 less than ten years before and the jury awarded
$2,800 for damage to the property which the owner retained.
32. See Philadelphia Ball Club, Ltd. v. City of Philadelphia, 192 Pa. 632, 44 Atl.
265 (1899), wherein a corporate owner of property affected by regrading of a city
street testified to a claim for damages for loss of future profits, which loss is of a noncompensable nature and the loss was not suffered in fact, and for alterations which were
neither necessary nor actually made as alleged.
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awards of delay damages, it is submitted that trial courts should be allowed
to direct detention verdicts, whether or not the. condemnee testifies, where
there is no basis for a reasonable inference that an excessive demand was
made or that such demand in fact caused the delay. Alternatively, the trial
court should be permitted discretion to give judgment n.o.v. for detention,
owner testimony notwithstanding, where the inferential chain is weak and
the condemnor has failed to support it by going forward with positive evidence
of bad faith or refusal to bargain. If the record contains such positive evidence as to raise a jury question, the issue should be decided under separate
instructions given after a value determination is made. Those instructions
could then allow for consideration of the relationship among all of the findings and contentions involved. This approach would give at least partial
interim recognition to the legislative mandate that compensation for delay of
payment in condemnation proceedings is recoverable as a matter of right.
J. M.

BODDINGTON

PUTATIVE FATHER OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILD IN CUSTODY
OF MOTHER DENIED THE PRIVILEGE OF VISITATION
Commonwealth ex rel. Golembewski v. Stanley
205 Pa. Super. 101, 208 A.2d 49 (1965).
In Commonwealth ex rel. Golembewski v. Stanley' the putative father
instituted a habeas corpus proceeding to obtain visitation privileges to his
illegitimate child in the custody of the mother. The court below permitted
the putative father to visit the child two days each week. On appeal the
Pennsylvania Superior Court reversed stating that "as a matter of legal
policy . . . it is detrimental to the welfare of an illegitimate child in the

'2
mother's custody to award visitation privileges to the putative father."
The mother, concededly a fit person to have custody, objected to visits
by the father because they created an intolerable condition. The putative
father would not marry the woman because he was caring for his mentally
incompetent mother. After insisting upon blood tests in fornication and
bastardy proceedings he acknowledged paternity and was ordered to pay
support for the child of $12.00 per week. He contended that since he was
helping to support the child, he had a right to visit the child.
The court based its decision to deny visitation privileges on Commonwealth ex rel. v. Spano.3 The Spano court held that a putative father has no
rights in his illegitimate 'child but only the duty of support and this support
obligation does not necessarily give rise to a right of visitation. 4 The court
reasoned that

It would be detrimental to the child's welfare to continue petitioner's
[the putative father] interest. It can only serve as a reminder to him
of his unfortunate status. His relationship with the [legitimate]
children of his father is bound to be confusing and disturbing. The
health and welfare of a child must not be shattered in the crossfire
of supposedly conflicting rights as to its custody. This principle
should be particularly applicable in this case where we see no legal
right of the father. 5
In denying visitation the Spano court also considered the problem of adoption. The consent of a father of an illegitimate child is unnecessary in
6
adoption proceedings.
To continue his interest and affection would only cause difficulty
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

205 Pa. Super. 101,
Id. at 102, 208 A.2d
68 Pa. D. & C. 248
Ibid.
Id. at 250.
6. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.

208 A.2d 49 (1965).
at 50. (Emphasis added.)
(Munic. Ct. Phila. 1949).

1 § 2(c) (1963).
431
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at the time of the adoption, in preventing a proper adjustment of
the child to his new relationships. It is for the best interest and
permanent welfare of the child to terminate now, while the child is
yet at a very tender age, all contacts between him and petitioner. 7
In Pennsylvania an illegitimate child is considered to be the child of its
mother and not of its father.8 The right of the mother to the custody of an
illegitimate child is superior to that of all other persons 9 including the putative
father. 10 Nevertheless, the ties of nature are respected in regard to the
child's maintenance." The putative father is entitled to the custody of the
child -as against all but the mother.1 2 Therefore, it would seem that in
Pennsylvania some right is recognized in the putative father concerning
custody of illegitimate children. It follows that visitation is but a limited form
of custody or habeas corpus would not lie. In custody cases the best interest
of the child is of paramount importance and all other considerations are
subordinate. 13 The "best interest rule" has been extended to cases involving
illegitimate children. 1 4 The Golembewski court, however, dismissed this rule
as a test and stated that as a matter of legal policy it is detrimental to the
welfare of an illegitimate child to be visited by the putative father when
the child is in the mother's custody. 15 This implies that it would always be
against the best interest of an illegitimate child in the mother's custody to be
visited by his father. Illustrative of a situation where the court found it to
be in the best interests of the child to grant the father the privilege of visitation is In re Anonymous. i" There the mother and putative father lived together for nine years. Out of this union were born two illegitimate children.
The mother left and married another man. The issue before the In re Anonymous court was whether the putative father should be allowed visitation
rights. In granting visitation, conditioned upon continued support payments,
the court reasoned:
Were this a situation where the children had merely been begotten
by the petitioner through a temporary illicit relationship with defendant, and he sought visitation, the court would make no such
7. Commonwealth ex rel. v. Spano, 68 Pa. D. & C. at 250 (Munic. Ct. Phila. 1949).
8. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 § 1.7 (1950).
9. Commonwealth ex rel. Minnick v. Wilson, 159 Pa. Super. 230, 232, 48 A.2d 27,
28 (1946).
10. Commonwealth ex rel. Kevitch v. McCue, 165 Pa. Super. 49, 51, 67 A.2d 582,
583 (1949) ; Commonwealth ex rel. Beil v. Fisler, 58 Dauph. 174, 175 (Pa. C.P. 1948).
11. Moritz v. Garnhart, 46 Pa. (7 Watts) 302, 303 (1838).
12. Pote's Appeal, 106 Pa. 574, 581 (1884).
13. Commonwealth ex rel. Shamenek v. Allen, 179 Pa. Super. 169, 176, 116 A.2d
336, 339 (1955).
14. See, e.g., Latney's Appeal, 146 Pa. Super. 20, 21 A.2d 521 (1941).
15. 205 Pa. Super. at 102, 208 A.2d at 50 (1965).
16. 12 Misc.2d 211, 172 N.Y.S.2d 186 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
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decision. Here, however, petitioner at all times acted as and lived
with these children in the relationship of their father, supporting
them in accordance with his means, and there seems to be no reason
why, in the absence of circumstances indicating that it would be
detrimental to the children to do so, he should be deprived of at
least seeing the children toward whom he has undoubtedly demonstrated a great deal of love and attention and whom he has supported during all of these years .... The court is of the opinion that

the close ties which existed between the petitioner and these children
since their birth should not now be disturbed and that17their welfare
requires that petitioner be allowed to visit with them.
What other practical and logical conclusion could be reached in such a
situation? Cases may arise where it will be for the best interest of the child
to learn that the putative father is interested in his continued welfare and
to have infused into him the natural love and affection that a child should
have for a father who is interested in his well-being.' 8 Another policy consideration bearing only indirectly on the best interests of the child is that
visitation allows the father by inspection to satisfy himself that the child is
being properly clothed and nourished and that steps are being taken concerning the child's moral and educational training. 19 It is submitted that it is
not, as a matter of legal policy, always detrimental to the welfare of an
illegitimate child to grant visitation privileges to a putative father.
The Golembewski court 20 in reversing the lower court on the basis of legal
policy gave no consideration to the discretionary judgment of the trial judge.
One reason for sustaining visitation privileges is a reluctance of the appellate
courts to reverse the lower court's discretion.2 1 Respect should be given the
opportunity given the trial judge to evaluate the situation. The judge has
had conversations with the parties and has observed them, placing him in
a better situation to form an estimate of their qualities 22 and to decide what
is for the best interest of the child. The printed record before the appellate
court can not replace such first hand observation.23 In all habeas corpus
proceedings in Pennsylvania by statute the superior court shall "make such
order upon the merits of the case, either in affirmance, reversal, or modification of the order appealed from, as to right and justice shall belong. '24 This
17. Id. at 213, 172 N.Y.S.2d at 188.
18. See Baker v. Baker, 81 N.J. Eq. 135, 85 Atl. 816 (1913).
19. Ibid.
20. 205 Pa. Super. 101, 208 A.2d 49 (1965).
21. See 26 Albany L. Rev. 335 (1962).
22. People ex rel. "Francois" v. "Ivanova," 14 App. Div.2d 317, 319, 221 N.Y.S.2d
75, 77 (1961) ; Ex parte Hendrix, 187 Okl. 40, 41, 100 P.2d 445, 446 (1940)
Leonard
v. Leonard, 98 A.2d 638, 639, 173 Pa. Super. 424, 425-426 (1953).
23. People ex rel. "Francois" v. "Ivanova," 14 App. Div. 2d 317, 319, 221 N.Y.S.2d

75, 77 (1961).
24.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 1874 (1951).
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has generally been interpreted to mean that weight shall be given the decision
of the lower court because it had a better opportunity to pass upon the ability
and character of the parties who were before the trial judge.2 5
Perhaps the court felt that denial of visitation was for the best interests
of the child. This may have been true. It is submitted, however, that the
best interest rule should control. It is not necessarily detrimental to an
illegitimate child that he be visited by his putative father. A return to the
best interest rule will permit Pennsylvania courts to render decisions based
on the welfare of the illegitimate child 26 rather than a foreclosure of the
issue as a matter of legal policy.
ROGER

B.

CUBBAGE

25. Commonwealth ex rel. Martino v. Blough 201 Pa. Super. 346, 349, 191 A.2d 918,
919 (1963) ; Commonwealth ex rel. Maines v. McCandless, 175 Pa. Super. 157, 161, 103
A.2d 480, 482 (1954) ; Commonwealth ex rel. Heller v. Yellin, 174 Pa. Super. 292, 298, 101
A.2d 452, 455 (1954). Contra, Commonwealth ex rel. Pressens v. Siegler, 167 Pa. Super.
598, 601, 76 A.2d 454, 455 (1950) (court must make an independent examination of
record).
26.

belong").

See

PA. STAT. ANN.

tit.

12 § 1874

(1951)

("as to right and justice shall

